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INTRODUCTION
Changes in the healthcare industry call for patients to become increasingly involved in
managing their own care and for physicians to take more responsibility for improving
the quality of care they provide. 1 As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services was tasked with developing and
publishing public scorecards, or report cards, on the quality of care provided by certain
physicians. 2 That mandate has taken the form of Physician Compare, a federal website
that publishes scorecards on individual physicians, and is intended to empower patients
with additional information to make informed healthcare choices and to incentivize
physicians to perform well. 3
The objective of this article is to examine the feasibility, benefits, and challenges of the
federal Physician Compare scorecard website for individual physicians. Section I will
discuss the problems of healthcare quality and cost the United States faces. Section II
will cover the federal government's use of public reporting regulations to address cost
and quality problems in the American healthcare system. This section will include a brief
overview of the National Practitioner Data Bank and a description of Physician Compare,
the federal website that is designed, in part, to publish scorecards for individual physicians.
Section III will analyze the feasibility of Physician Compare by examining the data used
for Physician Compare, stakeholder engagement in the reporting and publication process,
incentives for participation in Physician Compare, and website design.
Finally, this article concludes by arguing that Physician Compare may be able to fulfill
its worthy goals of improving patients' engagement in their own healthcare choices
and incentivizing physicians to provide better quality care. Physician Compare faces
many challenges, however, in achieving these aims. In particular, Physician Compare
has stumbled in developing both patients and physicians' basic knowledge of the site,
which adversely affects their level of engagement with the site. The site generally lacks
transparency around the data and analysis methods utilized to develop the quality
metrics that are published. Physician Compare has also struggled to strike an effective
balance between publishing comprehensive data while making the site understandable
and user-friendly for patients and physicians. Without changes in these areas, patients
and physicians will not realize the full benefits attainable from Physician Compare.

I. PROBLEMS OF HEALTHCARE QUALITY AND COST
IN THE UNITED STATES
The health care policy discussion is dominated by concerns over cost, quality, access,
and choice. The ultimate goal seems clear: increasing quality and decreasing cost
in United States healthcare, while retaining patient choice. 4 However, the way to
reach this goal is not obvious. 5 Defining quality is challenging, though the Institute
Section L
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of Medicine provides a useful starting point: "quality of care is the degree to which
health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired
health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge." 6 Yet, even
with this definition, the exact meaning of quality is still a moving target. Unanswered
questions about the meaning of quality include how cost to patients fits in; the role
of equity in access to care across the population; and whether quality simply means
providing only needed care. 7
Despite debate over the exact meaning of quality, there is agreement that quality and cost
in the United States health care market must improve. The United States spends more
per capita on healthcare than any other developed country 8 but has significantly worse
outcomes, particularly death from treatable conditions. 9 Wasteful spending constitutes
up to half of the $2.2 trillion the United States spends annually on health care. 10 A
majority of consumers say that inefficiency in the health care system not only drives
up cost but also decreases quality. 11 A recent study found that a decade of dramatic
increases in health care spending (from 1999 to 2009) wiped out any income gains the
average American family would have accrued in that period. 12
In addition to healthcare system-wide problems of low quality and high cost, it is also
extremely challenging for patients to find and understand information about how much
their care will cost and the quality of that care. Two key market failures that explain this
difficulty are (1) asymmetries in information and (2) agency relationships. 13
Asymmetries in information, the first market failure, occur when disparate information
is available to patients and physicians. 14 Because of the technical and complicated
nature of information about diagnosis, treatment, and outcome, it is strikingly difficult
in the current system for patients (and payers) 15 to evaluate quality and cost of
services. 16 At a basic level, it is challenging for patients to acquire the information
6
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necessary to "shop" for health services that are in their best interest. 17 As a result,
patients are often passive consumers in how they select physicians. 18 When choosing a
physician, patients with poor or fair health status are even less likely than the general
population to actively seek out formal quality information and may be more likely to
seek out informal advice from friends. 19 Physician scorecards could help all patients
become more active consumers in the selection of their physicians by decreasing the
cost and time necessary to weigh the costs and benefits of seeking care. 20 Moreover,
by easing access to information, scorecards could have a particularly positive impact
for those in poor health, for whom quality of care may matter more to than the general
population. 21
The second market failure that makes it difficult for patients to access and understand
quality and cost information is agency relationships. These relationships occur when
people "purchase" health services through at least one agent-an employer that provides
and subsidizes their health insurance, their health insurer, and/or their physician-who
guides their choices and may be subject to conflicts of interest in that guidance. 22 As
a result, patients may they feel they do not have power over their health care choices,
thus contributing to their role as passive consumers. While scorecards are not a cureall, 23 they may aid patients in gaining more control over their choice of physician24 and
allowing them to become better advocates in interactions with these agents.
To remedy these issues, the federal government's efforts over the years, particularly
with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), have promoted two goals.
The first goal is expanding the role of the marketplace through disseminating quality
information to consumers so that buyers of health services will reject lower-quality and
higher-cost services. 25 The second goal is changing reimbursement models through
setting and incentivizing quality standards. 26

17

Id. at 11.
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II. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE QUALITY
THROUGH PUBLIC REPORTING
A. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA)
Quality reporting as a response to problems in the American health care system has been
in place for over twenty-five years, though it has evolved significantly over time.
Congress passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) in 1986, 27
which is a notable milestone in health care quality reporting because it significantly
strengthened federal regulation of physicians and quality of care. 28 The HCQIA aimed
to improve quality by offering immunity from liability for peer review committees29 and
by creating a national, centralized databank for negative actions against physicians. 30
For the purposes of this article, the most important element of the HCQIA was the
establishment of the National Practitioner Data Bank (the Data Bank) and related
requirements. In response to a perceived medical malpractice crisis, 31 Congress
developed the Data Bank to prevent physicians who had disciplinary histories in one
state from moving to another state and practicing undetected. 32
Health care entities must report adverse actions, credentialing decisions, and licensure
decisions for individual physicians to the Board of Medical Examiners, which is then
required to report to the Data Bank. 33 Information in the Data Bank is only available
to professional users, including medical boards and hospitals, but not the public. 34 If
a health care entity fails to report, the Secretary publishes the name of the entity in the
Federal Register and the entity is given notice and opportunity to correct its failure; if the
entity still does not report, it will lose its civil damages immunity. 35 Hospitals are required
to check the Data Bank for this information before granting privileges to a physician and
every two years thereafter for physicians holding privileges at the hospital.3 6
From the 1990s onward, states responded to pressure to make information from the
Data Bank publicly available by establishing state-run systems to publish this data. 37
These systems provide a narrow window into quality of care, as they focus on adverse

27

Health Care
Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660 § 402, 100 Stat. 3784
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2012)).

28

See Kristin M. Madison, From HCQIA To The ACA: The Evolution
Improvement Tool, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 65 (2012).
29

See HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 111111 (2012).

30

See id. at§§ l 11131-33.

31

See, e.g., Elisabeth Ryzen, M.D., The National Practitioner Data Bank; Problems
13 J. LEGAL MED. 409 (1992)
the
and
of the Data Ban1c).

32

See42U.S.C.§llJOl.

33

See id. at§ 11133.

34

See id. at§ 11137.

35

See id. at§ 11133.

36
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37
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actions, rather than outcomes and process measurements. 38 For example, in 1996,
Massachusetts created and made available to the public individual physician profiles
that included information from the Data Bank, such as education and training, medical
malpractice and criminal history, and licensure and hospital actions. 39 Most states now
provide at least some information on board disciplinary action online, but the breadth of
information published varies. 40 For example, North Carolina required the publication of
malpractice information online in 2009. 41 In 2011, Illinois passed the Patient's Right to
Know Act, which requires a broader range of information on physicians to be publicly
available, similar to the Massachusetts system. 42
Although the "Q" in HCQIA stands for quality, the Data Bank provides a limited snapshot
of quality. 43 The Data Bank only documents information like malpractice settlements
and disciplinary actions, not the quality of care provided for a specific condition or even
in general. 44 New reporting systems, such as Physician Compare, have been developed
to try to capture more meaningful and comprehensive quality information than that
provided in the Data Bank. While new health care quality reporting systems are not
perfect, they are more comprehensive than the Data Bank and now usually include
"measures of provider quality based on providers' characteristics (such as education
or resources available), the process of care (such as whether care was delivered in
accordance with accepted guidelines), or patient outcomes (such as whether a patient
dies, is readmitted, or feels better)."45
B. The Affordable Care Act
The Patient ProtectionandAffordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted in 2010. 46 While much
of the ACA is focused on improving access to health insurance, 47 quality improvement
is a central tenet of the Act. 48 The ACA includes a number of provisions aimed at
developing and disseminating reliable data on quality and cost. 49 The ACA defines
quality as "a standard for measuring the performance and improvement of population
health or health plans, providers of services, and other clinicians in the delivery of health
care services."50 Quality goals include improving patient health outcomes and functional
38
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40
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status; making patients part of the decision-making process through patient-centered
care; and providing care that is timely, effective, safe, efficient, and innovative. 51
Two federal agencies within the Department of Health & Human Services share primary
responsibility for public reporting of quality data under the ACA: (1) the Agency for
Healthcare Research & Quality (AHRQ) and (2) the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS). The AHRQ is tasked with supporting research on the science of public
reporting and setting priorities for improving quality. 52 AHRQ publishes state- and
federal-level aggregate data, and does not report on individual physicians. 53 CMS is
tasked, in part, with preparing and posting scorecards on hospitals, physicians, and
other health care providers who participate in Medicare's new value-based purchasing
program, which bases payment partly on whether providers achieve targets for delivering
higher-quality care. 54 As part of this work, CMS is mandated to establish Physician
Compare, a website for publicly posting quality data on individual physicians. 55
C. Physician Compare

Compare websites existed prior to the ACA. For instance, Hospital Compare was
created in 2002, with the dual aim of helping patients make more informed decisions
about their hospital choices and incentivizing hospitals to provide higher-quality
care. 56 Hospital Compare now publishes quality information on approximately 4,000
hospitals, and the data information available is much more robust than that published
on Physician Compare. 57
Pursuant to its statutory authority under the ACA, 58 CMS launched Physician Compare
in 2010 with a two-fold purpose: (1) to "[p]rovide information to help consumers
make informed decisions about their health care; and (2) to "create clear incentives for
physicians to perform well." 59 At the time of writing, the site has quality data on some
group practices, as well as biographical information posted for individual physicians and

51

See id.

52

See id. at § 299b-33.

53

See James, supra note 24 at 2.

54

42 lJ.S.C. § 1395vvv1.

55

See id. at§ 1395w-5 (2010).

56

See

Compare, CMS.Gov,

information, responses from
and effective care, the likelihood a
readmission and death rates, use of medical
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58

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-5.
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quality data for some individual physicians. 60 Physician Compare also provides quality
data for certainACOs, although that information is available on a different webpage. 61
1. Data

CMS is publishing information on Physician Compare in two phases, focusing first on
group practices andACOs and then on individual physicians. 62 Physician Compare has
and will only report on physicians, 63 group practices, and ACOs that provide Medicare
services. 64 The underlying quality data comes from the Physician Quality Reporting
System (PQRS), which is also run by CMS. 65 PQRS is a "pay-for-reporting program
that gives eligible professionals incentives and payment adjustments if they report
quality measures satisfactorily."66 Entities choose which PQRS measures they want to
report to CMS. 67 Participants have to report on at least nine measures and meet certain
criteria, 68 but they still have a fair amount of leeway in choosing those measures. In
addition, they are required to report on only fifty percent of their Medicare Part B Feefor-Service (FFS) patients. 69
The group practice and ACO measures come from a subset of PQRS data known as
PQRS Group Practice Reporting Option andACO GPRO. These measures "encourage[]
eligible group practices [and ACOs] to report information about the quality of care they
provide to people with Medicare who have certain medical conditions."70 In 2014,
CMS published on Physician Compare the 2012 PQRS GPRO Diabetes Mellitus
(DM) and coronary artery disease (CAD) metrics for the group practices and ACOs

60

See inft-a Section II.c.1.

61

See

62

See About Physician Compare, supra note 59; inft'O Section !I.e. 1.

Section II.c. 1. and HI.d.

63
CMS uses the term "Eligible Professionals" (EPs) to characterize individual providers, but in
an effort to minimize the use of additional abbreviations here, this paper will refer to individual
physicians. EPs are those who are paid under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) and
include, among others: physicians, physician assistants, nmse practitioners, social workers,
psychologists, physical therapists, and occupational therapists. Eligible Professionals, CMS.
Gov, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instrmnents/PQRS/
dmvnloads/eligibleprofessionals. pdf
64

See A bout Physician Compare, supra note 59.

65

See id
Id

66
67

How to Get Started: 2016 PQRS, CMS.Gov, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-InitiativesPatient-Assessmen1-instrmnents/PQRS/How_To_Get_Started.html (last updated Nov. 18, 2015).

68

See id

69

See, e.g, 2015 Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS): Registry Reporting Made Simple
(2015), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-instrmnents/PQRS/
Dow.nloads/2015_PQRS_Registry_Reporting_Made_Simple.pdf Medicare Part B covers outpatient
care, including doctors' services. See Signing up for Part A and B, MEDICARE .Gov, https://www.
medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/get-parts-a-and-b/when-how-to-sign-up-for-part-a-and-part-b.
html#collapse-3100.

°

Compare: Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), MEDICARE.Gov, https://v.T\~r\v.
medica:re.gov/physiciancompare/staticpages/data/pqrs.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) [hereinafter
Physician Compare: PQRS].
7
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that successfully participated in PQRS. 71 Later in 2014, CMS published the 2013
PQRS GPRO and Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) DM and CAD measures for
139 group practices, 214 Shared Savings Program ACOs, 72 and 23 Pioneer ACOs. 73
However, it is important to note that although the ACO data is published on a website
with Physician Compare in the name, it is actually available on a different page than the
data for group practices and individual physicians. 74
CMS is taking a phased-in approach to publishing quality measures over time, 75
particularly for individual physicians. As of this writing, Physician Compare publicly
reports quality measures for group practices and ACOs. Individual physicians currently
have biographical information (e.g., education) and green check marks indicating
the federal quality programs in which they participate, 76 and approximately 175,000
individual physicians also have quality measures listed. 77
CMS has moved and is moving forward with posting quality measures for individual
physicians, but has somewhat scaled back in terms of what data it plans to publish in
the immediate future. CMS announced in the Calendar Year (CY) 2013 Physician Fee
Schedule (PFS) Final Rule with Comment Period that it intended to publicly report on
2014 PQRS quality metrics for individual physicians, consistent with§ 10331 of the
ACA, as early as CY 2015. 78 Despite concerns, in the CY 2014 Physician Fee Schedule

71

See About Physician Compare, supra note 59.

72

In a Shared Savings ACO, providers are jointly accountable for the quality of care they provide
and earn back from CMS some of the savings generated from providing higher-quality, lower-cost
care. Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, Kt\ISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept 14,
2015), http://khn.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/. Pioneer Program ACOs are
high-performing health systems that can pocket more of the financial savings in return for taking on
more financial risk Id.
73
Quality Data and Physician Compare, CMS.Gov, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/QualityInitiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/physician-compare-initiative/Quality-Data-andPhysician-Compare- .html (last updated Jun. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Quality Data and Physician
Compare].
74
See infra Section IH.c. Physician Compare for group practice and individual physicians and other
providers is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/. Physician Compare for
ACOs is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/aco/search.htmL (last updated
Jun. 15, 2016).

75

See About Physician Compare, supra note 59.

76

See Quality Data and Physician Compare, supra note 73. Where available, the site lists the
following for individual physicians and other providers: name; address; primary and secondary
specialties; affiliation with a group practice; clinical training information; gender; languages spoken
(other than English); hospital affiliation; American Board of Medical Specialties board certification
information; whether physician accepts Medicare assignn1ent; and indicator of satisfactory reporting
under the PQRS Incentive Program, Electronic Prescribing Incentive Program, and Electronic
Health Record Incentive Program. SYLVIA MATHEWS BuRWELL, CMS PHYSICIAN COMPARE REPORT
TO CONGRESS v-vi (2014 ), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/physician-compare-initiative/Dovvnloads/Physician-Compare-Report-to-Congress. pdf
77

See 2015 Individual Clinician Measures: Publicly Reported on Physician Compare in December
2016, CMS.Gov, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Jnitiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/physician-compare-initiative/Downloads/PC-2015-Clinician-Measures.pdf
78

See 78 Fed. Reg. 43281, 43355 (July 19, 2013).
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Final Rule, CMS planned to make available twenty 2013 individual PQRS measures
collected through a registry, electronic health record (EHR), or claims if "technically
feasible." 79 However, CMS then decided to publish fewer measures, and from a different
year, due to technical concerns and stakeholder feedback.so In December 2016, CMS
expanded the number of quality measures publicly reported on Physician Compare for
individuals, with data collected from claims and registry systems.s 1 Moving forward,
CMS will continue to annually post green check marks for each quality program in
which individual physicians participate.s2 CMS plans to continue phasing in more
measures for individual physicians and group practices. s3
Certain metrics will not be published on Physician Compare for individual physicians.
CMS' rationale for not including these measures, as well as analysis of CMS' decisions
regarding these measures, is discussed in Section III.A., below. The site will not
include patient satisfaction scores for individual physicians, though these scores will
be published for group practices. s4 Adverse actions, such as malpractice settlements,
that are stored in the Data Bank will also be unavailable on Physician Compare for
individual physicians. ss Furthermore, the site will not include cost metrics. s6
2. Physician Engagement

Although the ACA requires CMS to consider stakeholder input when selecting quality
measures for Physician Compare, CMS has struggled to develop strong engagement
among stakeholders. s7 As a result, CMS has implemented a number of strategies to
engage physicians and other healthcare entities in Physician Compare. For instance,
the agency has solicited input from professional stakeholders, including healthcare
providers and health systems, through rulemaking processes and outreach efforts, such
as town halls, webinars, and panels. ss
However, physicians who do or will have quality data published on Physician Compare
have limited options for input regarding their own data. As required under §1033l(b)
of the ACA, individual physicians have a 30-day preview period (though this may be

79

79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67765 (Nov. 13, 2014)
2013)).
80

78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74453-54) (Dec. I 0,

See 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67773 (Nov. 13, 2014). Commenters raised concerns that the PQRS data
surmoseato be
was collected in 2013, when individual
did not know
to be collected and
jJUC>HO,C<vU

81

See 2015 Individual Clinician lvfeasures:
supra note 77.
82

See 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67761 (Nov. 13, 2014).

83

See 79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67768 (Nov. 13, 2014).

84
85
86

See id

87

1890A of the Act, when
88

of the Affordable Care Act
from multi-stakeholder groups, consistent with sections
measures for
Compare.

79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67761 (Nov. 13, 2014).
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extended) to view quality data before it is published to Physician Compare. 89 Physicians
can use the Physician Compare Lookup Tool to determine if they have performance
scores available for preview and, if so, what their scores are. 90 However, there will not be
an appeals process in which physicians could dispute the quality data that is published. 91
The 30-day preview period does not apply to demographic data, 92 but feedback from
stakeholders about this limitation has had some effect. Physicians expressed concerns
about inaccuracies in their demographic information, specialty, and hospital affiliation,
which drove CMS to release steps for physicians to update their biographical data. 93
Now, physicians can submit updates to the Provider Emollment, Chain, and Ownership
System (PECOS), which is the underlying Medicare database that auto-populates the
Physician Compare website with this information, or to contact CMS directly. 94 CMS
has also updated the underlying PECOS database and incorporated Medicare claims
data to verify professionals' demographic information; while there are still complaints
about lags in updating, physicians have provided positive feedback on these changes. 95
Moving forward, the agency states that it is "continually working to improve [Physician
Compare] and the administrative and demographic information included." 96
3. Incentives to Participate

Physicians have no direct incentive to participate in Physician Compare because the data
is pulled automatically from PQRS. 97 However, the introduction of financial penalties
for failure to participate in PQRS, which began as a voluntary reporting system, has
incentivized the participation of physicians and other entities. 98
There is some indication that the quality information published on Physician Compare,
which is based on PQRS data, may soon be used to determine how much Medicare
will reimburse individual physicians-a shift that could be of great importance to
physicians. CMS already uses the PQRS data in its value-based purchasing program

89
78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74447 (Dec. 10, 2013); see also CMS.Gov., Guide to ""'""''""'
Preview Period, nm"·1mr.xrw
physician-compare-initiative/downloads/guide_to__physician_compare_preview_period.pelf (last
visitedFeb.14, 2017).

to_physician_compare__preview_period.pdf (last visited Feb.14, 2017).
91 See
Compare, supra note 73 ("[T]here will not be a formal
process. If measure data is collected and deemed suitable for pub[l]ic reporting, the data will be
published on Physician Compare. All data will be published
of whether measure
was confirmed.").
92

79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67770 (Nov. 13, 2014).

93

78 Fed. Reg. 74229, 74447 (Dec. 10, 2013).
Id.

94
95

79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67761 (Nov. 13, 2014).

96

79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67768 (Nov. 13, 2014).

97

See supra Section U.C. l.

98

See
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to calculate the value modifier. 99 The value modifier "provides for differential payment
to a physician or group of physicians under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule
(PFS) based upon the quality of care furnished compared to the cost of care during
a performance period." 100 The value modifier was originally only used for physician
groups with at least 100 eligible professionals, but will be phased in over time, and is set
to apply in 2018 to physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, clinical nurse
specialists, and certified registered nurse anesthetists who are solo practitioners and/
or in groups of two or more eligible professionals. 101 In its 2014 report to Congress,
CMS stated that it is already attempting to align Physician Compare with the value
modifier and implies that the data in Physician Compare could eventually be more
tightly integrated into a value-based payment model for physicians. 102
4. Website Design

The Physician Compare website has already undergone a number of design iterations
and will continue to evolve moving forward. Since the site's initial launch, CMS has
done a full redesign and improved the search functionality. 103
Additionally, benchmarking will not be used for individual physicians or group plans. 104
CMS was concerned that benchmarking would be difficult for consumers to understand;
that arbitrary thresholds may magnify minor performance differences; and that the
benchmark would be calculated inconsistently as compared to benchmarks CMS uses
in other programs. 1os
At the time the CY 2015 rule was finalized, CMS had also decided not to include any
other type of system in which physicians would be ranked against one another. 106 Rather,
the site displays performance rates visually, using a combination of numbers and five
stars, with each star symbolizing twenty percent. 107
In an effort to avoid overwhelming and confusing consumers moving forward, CMS
plans to include all measures in a downloadable file, but will not include all available

See
Design, CMS.Gov, nnr1<·1m~'m'
Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-instrurnents/PQRS/How___To_Get__Started.html
Toolkit).
99

15, 2016).
101

See id.

103

79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67762 (Nov. 13, 2014).

104

79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67774 (Nov. 13, 2014).

105

79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67761 (Nov. 13, 2014).

106

79 Fed. Reg. 67547, 67776 (Nov. 13, 2014).

107

See id.

12
Health Law & Policy Brief• Volume 11, Issue 1 •Winter 2017

data on the website itself. 108 CMS plans to do concept testing with consumers to see how
well they understand each measure and which measures allow them to become more
informed consumers. 109 Only measures that are understood by consumers and relevant
to patients making informed decisions will be included in the website. no
CMS conducts an online survey of visitors to Physician Compare. On average, Physician
Compare receives approximately 140,000 visits per month, with traffic spiking during
open enrollment periods for Medicare beneficiaries. rn On a five-point scale where 1 is
"very hard" and 5 is "very easy," approximately three-quarters of survey respondents
rated the site 3 out of 5 for ease of finding information and website navigation. 112

III.ANALYSIS OF PHYSICIAN COMPARE
A.Data
While CMS initially aimed to publish data from claims, registries, and EHRs, 113 its
strategy has been to publicly report only that data that is "technically feasible."ll 4 As
a result, CMS first planned to publish scores for 2014 PQRS measures gathered only
through claims, then expand later to data gathered through registries and EHRs, 115 and
now publishes data collected via claims and registries. 116
This preliminary and continuing use of claims data combined with a relatively small
minimum sample size of twenty patients 117 may open CMS up to legal challenges,
as was seen in New York in 2007. A number of major New York insurers developed
individual physician quality reporting programs, and New York's Office of the Attorney
General issued letters to these insurance companies expressing concern about how they
evaluated individual physicians. 118 The Attorney General's office eventually reached a
settlement with the insurers by working with the insurers themselves, the American
Medical Association, the Medical Society of the State of New York, and consumer
advocacy groups.ll 9 The settlement terms included changes to the way the insurers
collected and utilized quality metrics for individual physicians.
108
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For example, Aetna developed a physician-ranking program in which specialists were
ranked by quality and those who met certain quality standards were included in-network;
employers who selected the insurance plan with the physician-ranking program could
offer incentives to their employees to use that network. 120 The Attorney General stated
that the program carried "a significant risk of causing consumer confusion, if not
deception." 121 The Attorney General was especially concerned that the use of claims
data in ranking specialists would lead to an omission of clinically relevant information,
creating a system that is "inaccurate," "misleading," and not transparent. 122 The Attorney
General's particular concerns with the use of the claims data were: (1) claims data does
not include relevant information that would be available through other sources, such as
medical records; (2) the claims database is too small to create reliable rankings; (3) the
sample size (per physician) may be too small to allow for meaningful results; and (4)
many physicians may care for a patient during a clinical episode, so the quality metrics
should not be unfairly attributed to just one physician. 123
The first critique is directly applicable to Physician Compare, in that claims data
is inherently not comprehensive. The second critique may be less applicable to
Physician Compare because a claims database on a national scale is much larger than
that available to one insurer in one state. However, some commenters of the CMS
Physician Compare plan echoed the Attorney General's fourth concern that data would
be inaccurately attributed. 124
As to the third concern, while not specific to claims data, commenters of the CMS
plan have critiqued Physician Compare's minimum sample size of 20 patients per
physician 125 as too small. They are concerned a small sample size would not produce
enough information at the individual physician level to develop accurate sample sizes
and comparisons. 126 These concerns are grounded in real-world practice patterns, as
individual physicians see only a few patients compared to the number of patients a
hospital sees in the aggregate. 127 Consequently, scorecards for individual physicians
may not be representative of the care individual physicians actually provide, in that a
few patients could skew results.
On the other hand, the 20-patient sample size is similar to others in the quality reporting
arena. This sample size matches that used as a reliability threshold for PQRS reporting 128
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and is only ten patients fewer than the Joint Commission's required sample size of thirty
for hospitals' National Quality Improvement Goals. 129
In response to commenters' concerns about the sample size and other issues, CMS stated:

We ... believe strongly that individual-level measure data are important
in helping consumers make informed healthcare decisions, and that this
information should be posted on the site as soon as technically feasible ....
We are committed to including only the most accurate, statistically reliable and
valid quality of care measure data on Physician Compare when the data are
publicly reported. Any data found to be invalid or inaccurate for any reason will
not be publicly reported. 130
More specifically, CMS argued that the measures in question are already in use in the
PQRS program and have already undergone significant review. 131 CMS simply stated
that it believes attribution of care will be accurate on the site. 132 In future years, CMS will
continue to make sure measures are appropriately selected and reported. 133 Only data
that meets the accepted sample size will be reported, and CMS will evaluate language to
explain to the public why all individual physicians do not have data published. 134
While CMS goals make sense, CMS still has room to learn from the important
lessons arising from the New York insurance settlements before publishing data for
individual physicians. CMS must be sure that the data is accurate, such that a few
patients within the sample do not artificially inflate or deflate an individual physician's
scores. The reasoning for picking the sample size and any methodology utilized to
present data, including risk adjustment and attribution methods, must be both accurate
and transparent to physicians. CMS must also ensure that the sample size adequately
protects patient privacy. A small sample size may allow patients to be more easily
identified by their distinctive characteristics. For example, within a small sample
size, one variable (e.g. diagnosis, race, or gender) may be small enough to deduce the
identity of that individual patient. 135
Precise methodology and transparency is important not just for data accuracy but also
to prevent harming high-risk patients. Individual score cards in general, and Physician
Compare in particular, have generated worries that physicians will cherry-pick patients
in an effort to improve their scores. Commenters of the CMS plan for Physician Compare
were especially worried that doctors may be incentivized to tum away patients who have
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low health literacy, are poor, and/or are minorities often subject to healthcare inequities
because these patients could lower the physicians' quality ratings. 136
This is a concern that has played out, to some extent, in New York's reporting system for
mortality outcomes of cardiac surgeries, which publishes quality data for both hospitals
and individual physicians by name. 137 Critics have contended that, as a result of the New
York scorecards, higher-risk patients who need surgery are not receiving the intervention
they need in New York. 138 Rather, the system forces these patients to go to another state
for care. 139 In contrast, proponents of the New York system argue that it allows for
identification of inferior practices and minimizes the performance of procedures that
have an unjustifiably low chance of success. 140 They also contend that the scorecards
have significantly reduced the risk of dying from cardiac bypass surgery 141 and that
hospitals with low-rated physicians have lost market share. 142
In response to concerns that physicians will choose not to treat high-risk and vulnerable
patients, CMS argued that data collection at the hospital and group level has not led
to cherry picking of patients, so there is no reason to believe it will cause individual
physicians to turn away patients. 143 To further address concerns about potential
cherry picking, CMS plans to evaluate risk adjustment methodologies to make sure
that physicians with high-risk patient populations are not unduly penalized. 144 Risk
adjustment is a statistical process that adjusts quality measurements by accounting for
patients' characteristics that "may independently affect results of a given measure and
are not randomly distributed across all physicians submitting quality measures." 145
These characteristics may include the type and severity of illness, patient demographics
such as race and wealth, and insurance status. 146 Risk adjustment is intended to allow for
136
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a more fair comparison of patient outcomes across physicians by adjusting for patient
factors beyond the control of physicians. 147
Although CMS has stated that it will implement risk adjustment as required under
the ACA, 148 a risk adjustment formula is not clearly stated in the regulations. Rather,
CMS generally says, "we will continue to analyze the measure data to ensure that risk
adjustment concerns are taken into consideration," then refers readers to a Technical
Expert Panel website. 149
In setting a risk adjustment formula, CMS could again learn from the experience of
the New York cardiac outcomes reporting system. 150 The system is risk adjusted, and
the factors considered include age, the heart's pumping capacity, and previous heart
attacks. 151 In certain situations, for example, the death of a high-risk patient may only
count for half of mortality in the report. 152 As a result, doctors should not experience
decreased ratings for care provided to high-risk patients, thereby reducing the risk of
doctors cherry-picking patients. 153 Some critics have argued, however that this system
still promotes gaming, 154 perhaps because physicians do not understand or trust the risk
adjustment formula.
In addition to concerns about cherry picking, CMS will also have to balance the benefits
of including a robust risk adjustment formula with the potential for such an adjustment
to deplete the quality data of meaning. On the positive side, CMS could foster physician
buy-in by allowing physicians to have input regarding the risk adjustment formula. Risk
adjustment could also allow for the data to more accurately reflect the care provided, in
that higher risk patients would be given different weight than lower risk patients and not
artificially deflate a physicians' metrics. However, risk adjustment also introduces new
variables that increase the difficulty of making the data transparent and accessible for
both patients and physicians who are not well versed in risk adjustment methodology.
Changing the formula each year also introduces the risk that comparing data across
years could become an essentially meaningless exercise.
Analyzing what is not included in Physician Compare is just as important as analyzing
what is included. CMS currently does not plan to publish patient satisfaction scores
for individual physicians. Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems

147
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(CAHPS) surveys ask patients about their satisfaction and experience with healthcare, 155
results of which will be published on Physician Compare for group practices. 156
However, CAHPS measures for individual physicians are not currently collected, so
patient satisfaction data will not be published on the Physician Compare website. 157
Some commenters have expressed concerns that CAHPS surveys are too subjective and
expensive to conduct. 158 Commenters are also concerned that certain CAHPS measures
do not capture aspects of care, such as getting timely care, appointments, and access to
specialists, all of which individual physicians do not control. 159 It is unclear if patient
satisfaction metrics will ever to be included, and if so, how they will be developed.
Despite CMS' hesitance about publishing CAHPS patient satisfaction scores, the
increased industry focus on "patient-centered care," has led to the publication of
many surveys on patient satisfaction. 160 In addition to industry interest in quality, the
publication of satisfaction scores for individual physicians on consumer sites such as
HealthGrades.com and AngiesList.com may suggest that patients would like to see
this type of data, and potentially would use patient satisfaction scores published on
Physician Compare.
While consumer preference may incentivize the publication of patient satisfaction
measures, there are also additional reasons not to publish this data regardless of the
source. First, publication of patient satisfaction data may distract attention and resources
from publishing accurate and understandable quality metrics. 161 Second, consumers can
ask friends and family members about their satisfaction with a particular physician in
a way that is helpful for their decision-making without turning to a website. However,
the average layperson does not have the ability to aggregate, analyze, and present the
technical quality measures that would be available on Physician Compare. 162
At this point, it is not clear if patient satisfaction would be well received by patients or
physicians. With so many survey options and pros and cons to consider, CMS should
consider conducting additional research on whether patient satisfaction scores would
be useful for patients and physicians. If so, CMS may then aim to determine the most
effective methodology for gathering and presenting this data.
In addition to patient satisfaction scores, CMS also does not currently plan to publish
any cost data on Physician Compare for individual physicians. A potential downside of
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publishing cost information is that "[c]onsumers may be encouraged to choose doctors
because they are cheap rather than because they are good." 163 It may also not be clear if
the published data reflects the amount charged to the insurer or the out-of-pocket cost
the patient would be responsible for paying. This lack of clarity could decrease any
utility the cost data would have in helping patients make informed choices.
On the other hand, cost and quality are not always mutually exclusive, particularly in
the new regulatory era of increasing both value and quality. Cost is important in many
patients' healthcare decisions 164 and high costs may lead to negative effects on patients'
mental and physical health. 165 When patients are ultimately financially responsible for
their own care, some patients may seek out physicians who provide less expensive, but
not higher quality, care. 166 Giving patients the data to make that choice in an informed
manner is not necessarily a bad outcome.
One approach CMS could consider in publishing cost measures is that taken in the New
York insurance settlement agreements, which established a new reporting system. The
New York Attorney General and stakeholders agreed that cost could be published. 167 The
cost information is an efficiency measure that takes into account what doctors charge
for their services, as well as how many and what services they provide. 168 The published
result is a comparison of expected to actual cost provided, 169 though it is not clear in the
settlement or in Aetna 's materials whether this is the out-of-pocket cost to the consumer
or the amount charged to the insurer. The quality metrics must be separated out from the
cost measures, so that they are not mixed into a single metric. 170 If they are combined
for a total ranking of physician performance, the insurer must disclose the weight given
to both factors. 171
While Physician Compare will publish biographical information, including board
certification and education, it will not integrate the adverse actions housed in the Data
Bank. Whether and how the Data Bank and Physician Compare could be integrated
is a large enough topic for its own paper, and will not be addressed in-depth here, but
the importance of the Data Bank information to the public seems to weigh in favor of
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moving toward integration of the two systems. Patients may not care whether a doctor is
Board-certified, 172 but citizens' successful efforts to have states publish Data Bank-like
information on the state level 173 show that many patients would like to see information
on adverse actions and decisions. States publish a patchwork of different reports and
scorecards on this data, and a publicly available federal system would have the benefits
of potentially reaching a larger audience and using one standardized methodology
across the country. On the other hand, allowing states to continue to serve as laboratories
for this type of information may help researchers isolate the impact and unintended
consequences publication of this data could cause. 174
B. Physician Engagement

CMS has made extensive efforts to engage physicians and other professional stakeholders,
through the rule making process, town halls, and other avenues. 175 Stakeholders are still
concerned, however, that the processes used to publish data on Physician Compare are
not yet transparent enough. For example, commenters have requested that CMS publish
the results of validity and reliability studies. 176 In addition, Physician Compare will not
include an appeals process. 177
Without increased efforts to engage physicians and other stakeholders or develop an
appeals process, CMS may lose physician buy-in of Physician Compare. Again, CMS
should consider the New York insurance settlement agreements in terms of increasing
stakeholder buy-in and developing an appeals process. The agreements stress the
importance of transparency, and that methodology should be fully disclosed. 178 The
settlements also require the establishment of a "reasonable, prompt, and transparent"
appeals process in which physicians "have the right to correct errors and seek review of
data ... and may submit any additional information, including that contained in medical
charts, for consideration." 179
C. Incentives to Participate

There is no direct incentive to participate in Physician Compare. However, physicians,
group practices, and ACOs are incentivized to participate in PQRS through negative
payment adjustments if they do not report; 18 CMS then automatically pulls the data for
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Physician Compare from PQRS. 181 As noted above, health systems and physicians have
some leeway in choosing which measures to report, for which patients. 182
This somewhat discretionary reporting system may lead to gaming, in that individual
physicians or the entities through which they provide care (i.e. hospital administration)
could only report PQRS measures on which physicians have done well, for the patients
who have done well. 183 It could also lead to cherry picking patients, such that individual
physicians only choose patients whom they believe will be "good" risks. These risks
could materialize if physicians start to believe (whether accurately or not) that the
scores on Physician Compare could negatively affect their business. This reaction could
be particularly acute if physicians believe that the risk adjustment formula does not
adequately correct artificially decreased quality ratings.
However, consolidation in the industry may offset the potential for gaming and cherry
picking because health systems increasingly control how and what providers, particularly
physicians, report. Hospitals and physicians are consolidating through employment
arrangements and other structures to achieve the efficiencies of scale necessary to
improve quality and meet other regulatory requirements. 184 Hospitals are increasingly
purchasing or establishing other formal business relationships with physician practices,
and moving from hiring physicians as independent contractors to full-time employees. 185
This is not a new trend, 186 but it is accelerating in response to the Affordable Care Act
and other structural pressures for higher-quality, lower-cost care. 187 As a result of this
consolidation, individual physicians, except those in independent practices, may have
little control over which quality data is reported through PQRS and therefore have little
opportunity to game the system and select only low-risk patients.
Although consolidation may decrease individual physician's direct control over PQRS
reporting, health systems should be expected to game the system on behalf of physicians.
For example, if a majority of physicians, or even high-performing physician, receive bad
scores on a certain measure, the health system may not report that measure the following
year and may cherry-pick both the patients that it treats and the data that it reports in an
attempt to artificially increase scores.
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PQRS data is also already used to calculate payments under the value-based purchasing
program, and CMS seems to hint that Physician Compare could be used in the future
to calculate value-based reimbursement for individual physicians in some way, or at
least that Physician Compare and value-based purchasing could become more tightly
linked. 188 Linking Physician Compare more tightly with the value modifier calculations
may increase physician distrust of Physician Compare because Physician Compare could
impact not only a physician's professional reputation, but also his or her compensation.
On the other hand, entwining the two programs could provide an even greater incentive
for physicians to provide high-quality care. If CMS decides to base payments on data
published on Physician Compare, it must be sure that the data is accurate and that its
methodology is as transparent as possible for physicians.
D. Website Design

Overall, both the presentation of information on the website and the ease with which
Physician Compare can be found should be improved.
CMS states that it uses a combination of stars and numbers to present quality data on
Physician Compare. 189 However, stars may not be the most effective means to convey
information to patients. A 2015 study of how best to display physician quality data
found that patients were most likely to understand quality measures through the display
of an overall performance score and the use of colored dots and word icons. 190 While
star ratings were more effective than bars and numbers only, stars were only the thirdmost effective rating system in terms of patient understanding. 191
Although physicians are rated individually with the stars system, CMS has decided
against comparing physicians to a benchmark or otherwise rating physicians against
one another. 192 Benchmarking, however, may provide meaningful advantages in
improving quality, and CMS should more seriously consider including some sort
of benchmarking or ranking system. For physicians, benchmarking can be effective
in motivating engagement in quality improvement work and helping them compare
their performance to others. 193 In addition, benchmarking "can help stimulate healthy
competition" 194 among physicians. Physicians and CMS are already quite familiar
with and spend a lot of time on benchmarking and rating in other CMS programs, such
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as the expenditures benchmark in the Medicare Shared Savings Program for ACOs 195
and the Medicare five-star quality rating that allows users to compare nursing homes
to an average score. 196 CMS' expertise with benchmarking, as well as physicians'
familiarity with these types of ratings, could translate to more effective development
of benchmarking on Physician Compare.
In addition to what will and will not be included in the website design, it is also important
to consider whether the site is relatively easy to both find and use. One caveat is that,
as of this writing, Physician Compare only includes biographical data for individual
physicians and quality scores for group practices and certain individual physicians. 197
ACO information is on a separate site, though the ACO site has Physician Compare
in the name. So, the following discussion analyzes only what is currently available.
However, the current iterations of Physician Compare and the ACO site may signal
what CMS intends to do in terms of future design for the individual physician quality
information. Therefore, this is still a useful inquiry.
CMS plans for both patients and physicians to use Physician Compare, with patients
utilizing the quality information to make more informed healthcare choices and
physicians responding to the quality information by improving the quality of care they
provide. 198 Appealing to these two audiences presents a tough challenge for CMS. The
agency will need to describe the quality measures in a way that satisfies physicians'
requests for transparency and comprehensive descriptions of methodology, while still
keeping the site simple enough to support patient comprehension. The healthcare
industry entities that use the Data Bank information are steeped in medical malpractice
litigation, so they most likely have a sense of what a malpractice settlement or adverse
board action actually means, and would potentially find this information more useful
than the average patient would if it were published on the site. 199 Similarly, practitioners
will most likely have a deeper understanding than the average person of quality
data published on Physician Compare. Further, physicians are clamoring for a more
comprehensive presentation of information so they can be sure their data is accurate. In
contrast, lay people may not be able to fully understand and effectively utilize detailed
quality data. 200 In short, the downside of a simpler website and data presentation runs
the danger of attracting patients but obscuring the true complexity of the data, which
could upset physicians and reduce buy-in.
Currently, the Physician Compare and ACO Compare sites skew toward complexity,
though the design of the sites was not necessarily an intentional decision on the part
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of CMS to improve accuracy or transparency. For example, the Compare websites for
ACOs and group practices are completely separate, and it is difficult to navigate between
them. The main Physician Compare website, where a user can find the group practice
page and individual physician information that is currently available, does not include
an obvious link to the ACO Compare website. 201 The author had to do an extensive
Google search to find the ACO Compare website. 202 The challenge of finding the ACO
Compare sites through a simple Google search203 may mean patients will not use the
site. 204 As ACOs move toward increasing levels of care coordination across health
systems, 205 ACO quality data is arguably as important as individual physician data, if
not more so, for a patient seeking high quality care. CMS should consider strategies to
streamline the sites. Currently, the individual physician biographies include a link to
the physician's group affiliation(s) that brings patients to information on the affiliated
group. CMS could consider doing the same for ACOs with which individual physicians
are affiliated.
Despite CMS' efforts to improve usability, 206 Physician Compare for group practices
is still fairly unwieldy and the star system does not appear to be widely implemented.
The group practices page does not indicate which practices are scored (with the star
system or otherwise) and which are not. As a result, the user must randomly select
practices and may not find any group practices that have quality scores. The author
did not, in fact, find any group practices that had quality scores. Rather, in the field for
quality programs on all of the group practices the author selected, no quality data was
presented although there was a link to an outside website that describes the CMS quality
programs. Similarly, the author was unable to find individual physicians with quality
ratings on Physician Compare in searches by physician name, specialty, and location.
The difficulties of even finding the ACO Compare site, combined with the lack of clear
quality data on the ACO Compare site and for group practices on the Physician Compare
site, are issues CMS will need to address in future iteration for individual physicians if
the data on individual physicians is going to be useful. It should also not be difficult for
users to determine which physicians or practices have quality ratings and those ratings
should be presented consistently across the sites.
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In addition to making the site understandable for patients, CMS needs to encourage
patients to find and use Physician Compare. As mentioned above, Physician Compare,
particularly for ACOs, is currently hard to find and there does not appear to have been
much dissemination to patients. Poor dissemination may limit patients' use of the sites,
even if they would find the information useful. 207 The possibility of supporting more
patients in using the site and making informed healthcare decisions is still of value. To
further reach patients, CMS should consider increasing outreach and marketing about
the individual physician site, perhaps by working with health systems and physicians
to provide information in their offices and during appointments. Physician Compare
could also be more closely integrated with healthcare.gov so that patients could have
the information on quality at their fingertips when choosing a health insurance plan. For
example, a patient could see which physicians and ACOs she prefers based on quality
scores, then choose a plan through which she could receive care from that physician
and/or ACO.

CONCLUSION
Physician Compare has the potential to fulfill its dual goals of incentivizing physicians to
provide higher-quality care and supporting patients in becoming more active, informed
consumers. However, much work remains to be done. To maintain and grow physician
engagement, CMS must also continue efforts to ensure that Physician Compare 's
quality measures are accurate and are published in a transparent, understandable way.
Without increased dissemination and efforts to improve the clarity and usability of
Physician Compare, patients will not be able to fully utilize the information on quality
in choosing physicians.
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